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Abstract 
Little evidence links the strategic decisions of campaigns to individual-level voting 
behavior.  Yet for campaigns to matter in the way that experts argue, exposure to 
campaigns must also matter so there should be observable differences in the structure of 
vote choice between battleground and non-battleground states. Combining presidential 
campaign data with the Senate Election Study, we show that intense campaigning can 
activate factors like race, ideology, partisanship, and presidential approval.  We find that 
the campaigns affected different variables in 1988 than in 1992, which we hypothesize is 
the consequence of campaign messages.  
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Introduction 
 An emerging scholarly consensus that campaigns matter in elections is built on 
evidence showing that the public reacts to campaign events (Holbrook 1996; Hillygus 
2005), the issue context of elections influences vote choice (Clinton and Lapinski 2004; 
Carsey 2000; Simon 2002; Popkin 1991), and aggregate election results are related to 
campaign intensity (Shaw 1999a; Holbrook and McClurg 2005).  While such work 
refutes long-held notions that campaigns have “minimal effects,” limits remain to our 
evidence on whether voting behavior would be different in the absence of presidential 
campaigns.  In this paper we address this by examining whether the intense flows of 
information created by presidential campaigns in some locales but not elsewhere produce 
differences in voting behavior. 
Unlike most previous research, we examine how campaign decisions create 
geographically-driven information contexts in order to explicitly link them to voter 
decision-making.  In particular, we examine how fundamental predictors of vote choice 
like partisanship and presidential evaluation vary in importance across campaign contexts 
of different intensity.  By combining survey data from the Senate Election Study with a 
unique measure of state-wide campaign intensity from the 1988 and 1992 presidential 
elections, our study makes two contributions to knowledge on presidential campaign 
effects.  First, we show that individual voting can differ dramatically across campaign 
context thus providing rare individual-level evidence of campaign effects that result from 
the strategic allocation of campaign resources over the electoral map.  Second, our results 
suggest a dependence of such effects between years on the choice of campaign message.  
Though this second hypothesis bears further testing in future research, the fact that the 
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variables which are more important in battleground states than non-battleground states 
varies across election years is highly suggestive of this point. 
Research on Campaign Effects  
 For years, campaign effects research was plagued by a contradiction between 
common sense beliefs that campaigns influence voters and generally mild empirical 
evidence of such effects.  Two arguments emerged as political scientist’s reconciled 
instinct with evidence.  The first is that campaigns are strategic, with opposing candidates 
concentrating resources on the same locations (Shaw 1999b, 2006) and targeting subsets 
of the voting population (Huber and Arceneaux in press; Gerber and Green 2004, Chapter 
1; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Abramson and Claggett 2001; Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1992).  From this perspective, strategic considerations and selection processes mask 
campaign effects.  That is, the competitive pressures faced by campaigns minimize their 
aggregate and individual effects.  Seeking to avoid this problem, scholars use 
experimental designs to investigate the impact of negative advertising (Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar 1995), information complexity (Barker and Hansen 2005; Lau and Redlawsk 
2001), issue engagement (Simon 2002), and contacting techniques (Gerber and Green 
2004; Green and Gerber 2005) on voting behavior.  Still others use quasi-experimental 
designs to gain significant leverage using data from real campaigns (Huber and 
Arceneaux, in press) by focusing on voters in targeted media markets who are not in 
targeted states.  The general consensus of these studies is that campaigns can influence 
voters. 
 A second perspective sees campaigns as a series of events that are related in time, 
with the people who run them making decisions on a day-to-day basis, often in reaction 
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to events outside of their control.  When such dynamics are ignored, the argument goes, 
changes in public behavior that occur during the election are overlooked.  Accordingly, 
studies based on cross-sectional designs use an operational concept of campaigns that 
does not match reality and therefore find weak effects.  Gelman and King (1994), 
Holbrook (1996), Wlezien and Erickson (2002), Hillygus and Jackman (2003), and 
Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2005) all use longitudinal evidence from within a single 
campaign cycle to illustrate the impact of specific campaign events on the electorate, 
while Shaw (1999a, 2006) specifically demonstrates the effect of ad buys and campaign 
visits on statewide and media market outcomes. 
Though such research puts to rest lingering doubts about whether campaigns 
influence elections, there are still limits to what we know.  For example, experimental 
studies convincingly establish that voters can be influenced by advertising content and 
polarity but ultimately do not show that they do influence them in the complex 
environments characterizing actual campaigns where strategy might minimize actual 
effects.  Likewise, scholars interested in dynamic effects understandably focus on 
specific events (e.g., debates, conventions) or the impact of the campaign in its entirety 
(i.e., not measuring variation in campaign behavior), rather than the behavioral 
heterogeneity produced by campaign decisions that are reflected in geographic disparities 
in campaigning.  What remains to be seen in this literature is whether real campaigns 
influence individual behavior in meaningful ways through their strategic decisions. 1  In 
this paper we address these issues by, first, focusing on differences in real campaign 
context and, second, by examining how the underlying considerations of vote choice then 
differ in impact across campaign context.  To our knowledge, there is no other study that 
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examines the relationship between presidential campaign context and the impact of 
traditional predictors on vote choice. 2 
Campaign Effects and Predictors of Vote Choice  
 This paper tests the proposition that, given the inequitable distribution of 
campaign resources across the fifty states, where voters live determines the amount and 
type of campaign information available to them, and this in turn has important 
consequences for how the vote is structured.  Consider two states whose names are easily 
confused but whose campaign experiences in the 2004 election could not be more 
different, Iowa and Idaho. Neither presidential candidate visited Idaho, nor were there 
any media buys there by the candidates or parties in 2004.  At the same time Iowa was 
subjected to 17 campaign appearances by the presidential candidates, another 24 
appearances by the vice-presidential candidates, and enough media buys that the average 
Iowan could have seen 310 campaign ad airings.3  These are starkly different information 
environments and we expect that these differences have significant consequences for the 
structure of voter decisions.   
We expect that voters living in states with intense exposure to the campaign differ from 
voters living in states with relatively little direct exposure in two important ways.  First, 
we expect that their vote will be more structured and easily predicted by fundamental 
considerations.  Second, we expect that the mix of considerations voters bring to bear on 
the vote will differ across campaign contexts.  These effects, we argue, stem from how 
voter predispositions are connected to candidates during campaigns.  Here, our work is 
informed by a stream of research that begins with Berelson et al.’s (1954) emphasis on 
activation.  They note that most voter change during campaigns comes from partisans 
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who “return to the fold” (also see Finkel 1993).  More broadly, Gelman and King (1993) 
show that pre-election trial-heat polls became better predictors of the actual election 
outcomes as the election draws near, suggesting that campaigns “enlighten voters.”  
Several studies have taken up Gelman and King’s hypothesis with generally encouraging 
results (Stevenson and Vavreck 2000; Arceneaux 2005; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; 
Hillygus and Jackman 2003).  While these earlier demonstrations presumed that 
campaign information makes it easier for voters to cast their ballots the way one might 
expect them to given their underlying predispositions, there is no direct demonstration 
that such effects derive from exposure to specific information environments created by 
the campaigns or the extent to which it operates through voter predispositions.  
We assume that campaigns choose campaign messages based on the composition 
of the electorate as well as the prevailing issues and conditions of the day in order to tap 
voter attributes that have a prior history of affecting the vote and then allocate resources 
to communicate that message in the most efficient manner possible (Shaw 2006).  The 
idea here is that campaigns build their influence in elections by appealing to voter 
predispositions.  We are agnostic about the specific psychological mechanisms 
underlying these connections; they might occur through agenda setting, persuasion, or 
priming.  The key point is that campaign messages are used to help increase the 
connection between pre-existing voter attributes and interests and a specific candidate.  It 
is not merely a consequence of having an election, per se, so much as being exposed to 
campaign information that strengthens the connection between voter predilections and the 
choice between candidates. 
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While prior research conceives of this process almost solely in terms of 
partisanship (e.g., Finkel 1993; Berelson et al. 1954; but see Kahn and Kenny 1999), 
there is no reason to expect campaign to focus only on partisanship.  Though it remains 
an important way of connecting with voters, candidates would be remiss if they tried to 
tap partisanship at the expense of appealing to voters who are happy about a booming 
economy or upset with a flagging presidency.  We therefore expect that a broad array of 
fundamental considerations, including party identification, presidential approval, 
ideology, economic evaluations, etc., can be the raw material that campaigns tap through 
their resource allocation and communication strategies.   
Most critically, our approach differs in that we conceive of campaigns as being as 
much a function of space as of time (in contrast, see Bartels 2006).  As Shaw (2006) 
demonstrates, the imperative to expend resources in as efficient a manner possible leads 
campaigns to create dramatically different campaign contexts across both states and 
media markets.  If campaign effects depend on what campaigns communicate to voters, 
those voters who are most directly exposed to that information should be more strongly 
influenced by it than those who are relatively unexposed.  Specifically, voters in 
battleground states – where campaign information is plentiful – will behave differently 
than fellow citizens in states that are ignored by the campaigns and therefore relatively 
information poor with respect to the specific messages constructed by the presidential 
campaigns.  In short voting behavior is jointly produced by a combination of 
predispositions and campaign context, rather than each type of factor separately.   
What of voters in non-battleground states?  Does our framework imply that they 
are choosing at random?  Are they basing their votes on something other than 
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information?  In a word, no.  We do not claim that voters in these states are uninformed 
or that their behavior is un-structured.  Indeed, we fully expect that voters in the rest of 
the county are exposed to campaign messages through media coverage of campaign 
events, including those in the battleground states.   
But in a very real sense, they are experiencing the presidential campaign much 
differently than voters in battleground states.  First, they have less exposure to the 
specific messages, debates, and symbols that the campaigns use to influence voting 
behavior.  Second, to the extent that they do receive campaign information, it is heavily 
mediated.  As the media are more likely to present multiple points of view, provide 
alternative interpretations of issues and messages, and to focus on campaign strategy or 
horse race coverage, there is more ambiguity in what the information implies for voters.  
Altogether this means that intense campaign environments create more opportunities for 
underlying campaign messages to get to voters and in such a way that the intended 
meanings are less ambiguous for voters. 
As a consequence, if campaigns do in fact affect voting behavior by activating 
voter fundamentals with campaign information, we should find that voters in 
battleground states choose differently than voters in other states.  If this is not the case 
and we do not observe differences between voters in battleground and non-battleground 
states, it importantly implies that campaign decisions about what to communicate, where 
to communicate it, and when are unimportant for how they influence voter decision-
making.  This in turn would imply a different model of “campaign effects” that 
downplays the role of resource allocation and highlights other considerations. 
Data and Methods 
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 Measuring the Battleground States.  Testing our argument hinges on the fact that 
presidential campaigns do not distribute resources equitably across states (Shaw 1999a, 
2006).  Since states are unequal in terms of advertising costs, competitiveness, and 
Electoral College votes, presidential campaigns choose to spend almost no resources in 
some states while saturating others with visits, commercials, campaign paraphernalia, 
voter contacts, and the like.  The end result is that not all voters live in the same 
campaign context, providing us with the opportunity to study campaigns by treating them 
as contextual effects.  Since our hypotheses focus on differences in voting behavior that 
are a product of campaign contexts, we need a valid measure of state campaign intensity.  
We use three readily available indicators of presidential campaign behavior to 
build our measure.  Two of them – presidential advertising purchases and candidate visits 
– were gathered by Daron Shaw and made available in his 1999 American Political 
Science Review article.  The third is a measure of national party monetary transfers to the 
states.4  Including party transfers is important because they played an important role in 
presidential campaigns throughout the 1990s and because they are more widely 
distributed across states, thus providing additional variation in our key independent 
variable.  We combine these three indicators by standardizing each within campaign year 
and then summing them together into a single measure of campaign intensity.  This then 
is used as the basis for identifying the battleground states: those states in the top third of 
the summary measure in each of the election years.5 
Since our survey data are for 1988 and 1992 (see below), we can establish validity 
for our measure by comparing it to Shaw’s (1999b) data on Electoral College strategies 
that are gleaned from the campaign's strategy memos.  Of all the states he identifies as 
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being considered a “battleground” by both campaigns, all of them are similarly measured 
with our data.  Moreover, of all the states identified as a battleground by at least one of 
the campaigns, we are consistent in all but two cases (out of seventeen).  Although we 
pick up a fair amount of campaigning in states that are not listed in Shaw’s classification 
(e.g., South Carolina in 1988), the vast majority of those are cases in which the data show 
the campaign did not follow their plan and therefore did campaign in those states.  All in 
all, we believe this clearly establishes the validity of our battleground measure.6 
 Individual-Level Data.  Investigating our hypotheses also requires individual-
level observational data within the states.  Two criteria exist for the individual-level data: 
1) there must be a large enough sample size within each state to produce stable 
coefficient estimates and 2) our respondents must have been surveyed at approximately 
the same time to minimize the impact of temporal dynamics as an alternative explanation.  
Although there are many national survey samples with appropriate sample sizes or the 
appropriate measures, only the Senate Election Study (Miller et al. 1999) meets both 
these criteria.  This study was constructed primarily for studying views of Senators and 
senatorial candidates in each electoral year from 1988 to 1992.  However, it includes 
many of the variables essential for studying presidential voting behavior and is therefore 
useful for our purposes. 
In 1988 and1992, roughly 60 voting-age citizens were interviewed in each of the 
50 states.7  For this study, we draw on the 1988 and 1992 data which provides us with 
approximately 5,859 survey responses.  Of this sample, 4,394 reported voting in the 
November elections (4,344 in the presidential election) with 3,857 respondents providing 
a presidential vote choice.  From this study we draw the basic independent variables for 
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the analysis, each of which is described and summarized in Appendix B.  They include 
familiar predictors of vote choice available in the National Election Study, such as 
partisanship, race, ideology, etc.  To account for the unique structure of these data, all of 
our estimates use appropriate population weights and clustered standard errors by state. 
Vote Choice, Fundamental Considerations, and Campaign Context 
 We now turn to an examination of how campaign intensity influences the mix of 
variables that are important to presidential vote choice.  It is important at the outset to be 
clear that our interest here is not just in whether there is a direct relationship between 
campaign activity and vote choice, but rather in how the campaigns structure the 
underlying determinants of vote choice and make them better (or stronger) predictors of 
what citizens do.  Our logic here flows directly from the proposition that campaigns 
engage “fundamental” considerations such as partisanship and presidential evaluations 
(Campbell 2000; Gelman and King 1993).  The basic idea is that campaigns deliver 
messages that reinforce party identification and remind voters of the issues at hand, 
especially those related to presidential performance.  If this is the case, then we expect to 
see the fundamentals of vote choice play a stronger role in states in which the presidential 
campaign is intense than in states in which the level of campaign activity is relatively 
minimal.8  We also develop and test a fundamental vote choice model and examine its 
results under different campaign contexts.  The model includes measures of partisanship, 
presidential approval, economic attitudes, political ideology, and demographic 
characteristics.9   
The analysis of the differential impact of fundamental considerations in 
battleground and non-battleground states is presented in Tables 1 and 2.  In both of these 
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tables we regress vote choice on the basic model for the full sample and then also for the 
battleground and non-battleground samples.  There are two general questions that we 
answer here.  First, does the model of fundamental considerations “fit” better in 
battleground states than in other states and, second, are certain fundamental 
considerations activated by the campaign to produce significantly stronger effects in the 
battleground states than in other states? 
 Turn to the analysis of the 1988 election presented in Table 1, where the choice 
between Bush and Dukakis is estimated with a logit model.  Here we see that the 
fundamental model is strongly related to vote choice and that the variables we expect to 
be important (party, approval, ideology economy) obtain standard levels of statistical 
significance.   Turning to the issue of whether the model overall performs better in the 
battleground states, we see that the pseudo R2 is .57 in low intensity states and .67 in 
battleground states.  On its face, this looks like a significant increase in explanatory 
power.  When put to a test of statistical significant, however, we find the difference is 
marginally significant (p=.076).10 
[Table 1 about here] 
 With respect to specific coefficients we see that while many of the differences are 
trivial, two variables – ideology and race – stand out as significantly stronger in the 
battleground states than in other states.11 We can gain an appreciation of the magnitude of 
these differences by turning to Figure 1, which plots the probability of casting a vote for 
Bush for different levels of ideology and race (all other variables set to their median 
values). Here we see a relatively flat slope for ideology in non-battleground states and a 
much steeper slope in battleground states.  The total estimated difference in probability of 
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voting for Bush between a very liberal and very conservative respondent was .14 in non-
battleground states and fully .39 in battleground states.  The lower part of Figure 1 shows 
how race was activated by the 1988 campaign.  Here we see that there was no racial gap 
in voting in non-battleground states but a substantial gap in battleground states, where the 
difference in the probability of voting for Bush between black respondents and all others 
was .33.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
 In Table 2 we find results that are similar in that the campaign seems closely 
related to the impact of fundamentals in 1992, but different in that the specific 
fundamentals affected are themselves not the same as in 1988.12  Here we see additional 
evidence that different sets of considerations are important in battleground states than in 
other states.  Focusing again on the overall fit of the model we see that the pseudo R2 in 
battleground states (.60) is substantially larger than in other states (.48), thus indicating 
that, as a whole, the fundamental variables used in this model more adequately explain 
vote choice where the campaign is intense than where it is not.13  To be sure, the vote is 
still structured in non-battleground state, just not as structured by the fundamental 
considerations as in battleground states. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 An examination of the individual coefficients reveals some additional, mostly 
intuitive, differences between the two models.14  First, the fundamental considerations of 
party identification and presidential approval are much stronger determinants of vote 
choice in battleground states than in other states.  Not only is the difference in slopes 
statistically significant but also it is substantively very important.  The top two panes of 
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Figure 2 illustrate how the influence of party identification and presidential approval on 
vote choice is conditioned campaign intensity.  In both cases the translation of attitude 
into vote is much swifter and stronger in battleground states than in other states.  These 
differences are exactly what might be expected given our hypothesis. 
 We do have one important contrary finding in Table 2 – economic evaluations are 
significantly related to vote choice in low intensity states but not in battleground states.  
One possibility is that given the dramatic influence of presidential approval in 
battleground states, economic evaluation are subsumed under that broader evaluation.  A 
second possibility is that some complex relationship among partisanship, presidential 
approval and economic evaluations is producing this unexpected result.  There is some 
evidence for both explanations.  A bivariate analysis shows that the economic attitude-
vote relationship is stronger in battleground states (Cramer’s V=.35) than in the other 
states (Cramer’s V=.28).  Moreover, economic evaluations are more strongly determined 
by partisanship and approval in battleground states (R2=.28) than in the other states 
(R2=.18).15  
Otherwise we are at a loss to explain this anomaly, except to say that the impact 
of economic evaluations is really quite meager compared to the impact of party 
identification and presidential approval.  The bottom pane of Figure 2 makes this point 
fairly clearly.   Here we see that while that while economic evaluations are of some 
consequence in non-battleground states (the slope for battleground states is not 
significant), their impact pales in comparison to the other considerations in Figure 2 and, 
overall, contribute much less to the overall explanation.  Finally, the slope for respondent 
sex is significant and in an unexpected direction in battleground states but not significant 
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in other states.  While this is the case, the difference in slopes between the two samples is 
not statistically significant. 
Why Does the Impact of Campaign Fundamentals Differ From 1988 to 1992? 
While we expected to find that campaigns would influence the relevance of 
factors other than partisanship on voting, we did not expect to find that partisanship 
would not be activated in the 1988 campaign or that factors impacted by the campaign 
would matter significantly from 1988 to 1992.  This raises an interesting question, though 
one we had not anticipated – why are these fundamentals influenced rather than others?  
We are able to spin a post hoc answer that is related to the themes of the campaign that 
we believe has merit, though one that is admittedly is in need of additional empirical 
testing.16 
The foundation for this conjecture comes from Berelson et al.’s original 
arguments about activation, particularly when we consider their interpretation of Harry 
Truman’s comeback in the 1948 presidential election.  According to them, Truman’s 
recovery was not due to changes in evaluations of his character or competence but to an 
increase in the salience of class-related issues late in the campaign:  
The campaign was characterized by a resurgence of attention to socioeconomic 
maters, at the expense of international issues.  The image of Truman did not 
change, but the image of what was important in the campaign--and perhaps even 
the image of what Truman stood for--did change to a dominance of 
socioeconomic issues (1954:264). 
   
In effect they argue that, as Truman shifted the focus of the campaign to class issues, he 
activated those considerations among his wandering supporters and they came home to 
vote for him.   We suspect that this same argument applies to our data as well, with the 
type of issues raised by the campaigns influencing the type of fundamental considerations 
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that loom larger in people’s voting calculations across years.  And, as campaign strategy 
provides for more intense, less ambiguous information environments these ought to have 
a larger impact on voters in battleground states than in non-battleground states. 
At first blush, the cross-campaign differences are sensible.  For example, the 1988 
campaign was marked by racial overtones.  Of particular interest here are the findings 
from Mendelberg’s (2001) analysis, which showed that the Willie Horton ad (and 
coverage of it) not only primed racial attitudes but also primed ideology as an influence 
on candidate evaluations in the 1998 presidential contest.  In addition, Gwiasda’s (2001) 
finding that media coverage of the Willie Horton ad had an influence on general 
perceptions of Michael Dukakis’ ideological position also buttresses our findings.  
Similarly, Geer (2005, p. 91) shows that a key racial issue – crime – was intensely pushed 
by George Bush in his negative advertising (27-percent of all Republican negative ads 
that year). 
In contrast, the 1992 is often remembered for emphasizing the poor performance 
of the incumbent administration, particularly with regards to the economy.  In that sense, 
it is a classic retrospective-voting election with – importantly – blame focused on the tax 
increases agreed to by the Bush administration and responsibility for the economic 
downturn being laid at his feet by the Clinton campaign.  Illustrative evidence comes 
from Geer’s account of advertising in the 1992 campaign.  The Clinton campaign ran 
over 30-percent of their negative ads on “economic times,” while the Bush campaign ran 
over 30-percent on taxes (with Clinton running 17-percent of his positive ads on taxes as 
well, essentially claiming he would not increase taxes on any but the rich).   
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We would be remiss if we did not point out that accepting this as a possible 
interpretation requires us to believe that the economic question was less about feelings on 
the economy than it was a review of President Bush’s performance and that we have no 
strong evidence supporting that assertion.  Yet, it is not entirely inconsistent with other 
evidence on voting behavior in 1992, as well as our own finding about how economic 
factors behave as expected when incumbent evaluations are dropped from our model.  
For example, Holbrook (1994) shows that consumer sentiment had an impact on 
candidate preferences that was roughly 1/3rd as large as the impact as presidential 
evaluation in a model that controls for the sequence of campaign events, but not for 
geographical differences in campaigning.  Similarly, Hetherington (1996) shows that the 
standardized coefficient for candidate evaluation – an indirect measure of presidential 
popularity – is roughly four times as large as it is for economic evaluations in influencing 
vote choice.  While none of this is definitive proof of our assumption, it is generally 
consistent with the hypothesis.   
However, we believe that this hypothesis warrants closer attention than we can 
give it here.  But more centrally for our argument, none of this is inconsistent with the 
original conjecture that the different information contexts created by campaigns 
ultimately matter for the final vote decisions made by voters on Election Day within the 
context of a single election.  On that score, our evidence is not ambiguous. 
 
Conclusion 
 The point of this paper is to demonstrate that the unique electoral contexts created 
by presidential campaigns affect the way that voters behave, specifically by influencing 
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the relationship of vote choice to its fundamental predictors.  Our evidence shows most 
fundamentally that voters behave in a more predictable fashion in intense campaign states 
than in low intensity states.  Given that differences between states reflect information 
environments produced by strategic decisions made by presidential campaigns, this is a 
strong demonstration that the decisions made by campaigns affect election outcomes 
through how they structure voting.  We also find that presidential campaigns enhance the 
effect of retrospective presidential evaluations and partisanship on the eventual vote 
choice in 1992 and race and ideology in 1988.  Also of interest is that our interpretation 
of the cross-election differences suggests a link between the choice of message used in 
campaigns and the types of fundamentals that end up being significant for voting in the 
battleground states. 
 The primary drawback of our analysis is that we do not tackle the difficult 
problem of measuring campaign content.  Even though the distribution of resources and 
the subsequent effect they have on voters is important, such strategic decisions are only a 
subset of what campaigns must consider.  And given that campaigns coordinate their 
resources so closely (Shaw 1999b, 2006), it can be argued that the most important 
decisions presidential campaigns make are on how to pitch their candidate and his issues.  
Our evidence, unfortunately, cannot determine which campaign had the better message.  
However, the differences in the fundamentals that were important in 1988 – race and 
ideology – and in 1992 – presidential approval and partisanship – are consistent with 
conventional wisdom on the messages that dominated those elections and provides an 
intriguing hypothesis for future research. 
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Although the evidence is not without its limitations, it makes a clear contribution 
to our understanding of how campaigns affect voting behavior.  Importantly, it buttresses 
an emerging theme in political science – modern election campaigns have substantial 
effects on election outcomes and voting behavior.  In this analysis we have focused on an 
important element of this story; that is how campaign activity influences the mix of 
considerations people bring to bear on their vote decision. 
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Table 1. Fundamental Characteristics and vote Choice in the 1988 Presidential Election, 
by Campaign Intensity (Logit estimates, Standard Errors Clustered by State) 
 
 Full Sample Low Intensity 
States 
Battleground 
States 
Differences 
  
b 
 
s.e. 
 
b 
 
s.e. 
 
b 
 
s.e. 
Slope 
Difference 
 
t-score 
Party Identification 0.786 0.063* 0.75 0.073* 0.834 0.13* 0.084 0.690 
Presidential Approval 0.793 0.114* 0.832 0.150* 0.782 0.232* -0.05 -0.230 
Ideology 0.807 0.177* 0.489 0.164* 1.179 0.26* 0.69 1.81* 
National Economy 0.328 0.118* 0.364 0.153* 0.286 0.216 -0.078 -0.330 
Black -0.725 0.812 -0.011 0.952 -2.18 0.566* -2.17 -1.96* 
Income -0.019 0.070 0.027 0.091 -0.046 0.117 -0.073 -0.580 
Female 0.299 0.291 0.221 0.267 0.287 0.461 0.066 0.110 
Constant -1.106 0.291 -1.112 0.429* -1.188 0.649# -- -- 
N 
X2 
Pseudo R2 
1514 
443.0 
.61 
 1052 
280.6 
.57 
 462 
493.71 
.67 
   
 
 
*p<.05, two-tailed test. 
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Table 2. Fundamental Characteristics and vote Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election, 
by Campaign Intensity (Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors Clustered by State) 
  Full Sample Low Intensity Battleground States Differences 
  b s.e. b s.e. B s.e. Slope 
Difference 
t-score 
Bush 
Party 0.855 0.063* 0.800 0.078* 1.066* 0.107 0.267 2.01* 
 Strength of 
Partisanship -0.013 0.155* -0.022 0.170 -0.064 0.367 -0.042 -0.10 
 
Approval 1.770 0.136 1.608 0.151* 2.423* 0.219 0.815 3.07* 
 
Ideology 1.088 0.230* 1.051 0.334* 1.325* 0.220 0.274 0.68 
 
Economy 0.375 0.160* 0.569 0.194* -0.179 0.189 -0.747 -2.76* 
 
Black -1.57 .74* -1.91 .583* -.907 0.904 1.003 0.93 
 
Income -0.082 0.076 -0.098 0.103 0.049 0.062 0.147 1.22 
 
Female 0.805 0.301* 0.479 0.277 1.653* 0.705 1.174 1.55 
 
Constant -2.830 0.563* -2.134 0.561 -5.325 1.190 -3.191 -2.43 
 
         
Perot 
Party 0.520 0.079* 0.495 0.096* 0.582* 0.149 0.087 0.49 
 Strength of 
Partisanship -0.490 0.110* -0.468 0.150* -0.573* 0.173 -0.104 -0.46 
 
Approval 0.304 0.101* 0.229 0.125 0.458* 0.169 0.230 1.09 
 
Ideology 0.493 0.191* 0.472 0.252* 0.598* 0.242 0.126 0.36 
 
Economy 0.078 0.114 0.040 0.134 0.083 0.222 0.042 0.16 
 
Black -3.34 1.06* -2.79 01.06* -34.433* 0.598 -31.64 -26.00* 
 
Income -0.068 0.058 -0.128 0.059 0.041 0.109 0.170 1.37 
 
Female -0.129 0.210 -0.335 0.244 0.296 0.375 0.631 1.41 
 
Constant 0.593 0.413 1.015 0.475* -0.219 0.644 -1.234 -1.54 
N 
X2 
Pseudo R2 
 1500 
858.3 
.52 
 995 
1505.7 
.48 
 505 
28751 
.60 
   
 
*p<.05, two-tailed test. 
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Figure 1. The Differential Impact of Ideology and Race on Presidential Vote, 1988 
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Figure 2. The Differential Impact of Fundamental Variables on Presidential Vote, 1992 
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Appendix A 
Measuring the Battleground States 
 
We use a behavioral measure of campaign context to distinguish between the 
battleground and non-battleground states.  We do this by measuring the relative intensity 
with which campaigns disperse three different types of resources – presidential ad buys, 
candidate visits, and party transfers – into the three states.  While this undoubtedly misses 
some important sources of information (e.g., independent expenditures), it undoubtedly 
picks up the most important sources of cross-contextual variation stemming from 
presidential campaigns themselves. 
 
To validate this measure, we compare it against an independent measure of campaign 
context that was based on qualitative evidence (see Shaw 1999b, 2006 for a discussion of 
how he uses campaign materials to establish campaign Electoral College strategies).  In 
Shaw’s classification, campaigns could view states as being (1) a battleground, (2) 
marginal and leaning toward one party, or (3) a base state that leans strongly toward one 
party.  He then compares the intra-party classifications of both of the major party’s 
campaigns in order to get some sense of which states were targeted in the 1988-2004 
presidential campaigns. 
 
Our approach is to examine which states were identified as a battleground by both major 
party campaigns, by at least one of the major party campaigns, or as marginal by both 
major party campaigns.  The assumption is that these targeting classifications should 
make a state more likely to receive a significant amount of attention from the presidential 
campaigns and therefore an “actual” battleground. 
 
Table A-1 reports the results of our comparison.  All of the states listed in the second row 
of this table were marked as “battleground states” with our measure.  The stars indicate 
their relative position in the Shaw ranking described above.  As this table makes clear, 
our measure has relatively high overlap with Shaw’s ranking.  There is a 78-percent 
overlap in 1988, 82-percent overlap in 1992, and 80-percent overlap over both years.  
This suggests a substantial amount of content validity for our measure, though this is due 
in part to a large number of easy calls (i.e., states where there is no campaigning). 
 
[Table A-1 about here] 
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Table A-1.  Validity of Battleground Measure.  Our measure of battleground states is 
based on the actual intensity of the presidential campaign within each electoral year.  
This table compares a different measure derived by Shaw (1999b). 
 
Battleground States in 1988 Battleground States in 1992 
 
California*** 
Colorado 
Connecticut* 
Hawaii 
Illinois** 
Kentucky 
Massachusetts 
Michigan** 
Missouri*** 
Montana 
New Jersey** 
New York** 
Ohio*** 
Pennsylvania** 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Texas*** 
Vermont* 
Washington** 
 
 
Colorado** 
Connecticut* 
Georgia*** 
Kentucky** 
Louisiana** 
Michigan *** 
Missouri** 
Montana** 
North Carolina** 
North Dakota 
New Jersey*** 
New Mexico** 
Ohio*** 
Pennsylvania** 
Texas* 
Vermont 
Wisconsin** 
 
 
States from Shaw (1999b) left out: 
 
• Two battleground – none 
 
• One battleground – Oregon 
 
• Two  marginal – Delaware, Maine, 
Wisconsin 
 
 
 
States from Shaw (1999b) left out: 
 
• Two battleground – none 
 
• One battleground – Maine 
 
• Two  marginal – Delaware, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Washington, Alabama, South 
Dakota 
 
 
 
***– Identified as battleground by both campaigns 
** – Identified as battleground by one campaign 
* – Identified as marginal by both campaigns 
 
Holbrook and McClurg, “Mechanisms, p. 28 
Appendix B 
Variable Descriptions and Statistics 
Table B-1.  Variable Descriptions. 
Variable 
name 
 
Description 
 
N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
 
Campaign 
resources 
 
Composite measure of campaign resources 
expended in a state based on party transfers, 
candidate advertising, and candidate visits that 
were standardized by year and then summed 
together. Negative scores indicate little 
campaigning; high scores suggest extensive 
campaigning. 
 
 
5859 
 
 
-0.07 
 
1.85 
 
-1.80, 
7.43 
Battleground 
 
All states in the top quartile of the campaign 
resources variable were determined to be a 
“battleground.” 
 
5859 0.35 0.48 0,1 
Education Survey-based measure of education.  0=8 grades 
or less, 6=advanced degree 
 
5665 3.02 1.60 0,6 
Partisanship Seven point measure of partisanship. -3=Strong 
Democrat, 3=Strong Republican 
 
5491 -0.61 2.12 -3,3 
Ideology Three point measure of ideology.  -1=Liberal, 
1=Conservative 
 
5424 0.27 0.83 -1,1 
Presidential 
approval 
Job rating of incumbent president. 0=Disapprove 
strongly, 3=Approve strongly 
 
5164 1.62 1.20 0,3 
National 
economic 
evaluation 
Retrospective evaluation of national financial 
situation.  -2=Much worse, 2=Much better 
 
 
5688 -0.39 1.08 -2,2 
Black Respondent reports being an African-American. 
0=Not black, 1=black 
 
5811 0.14 0.51 0,1 
Female Respondent is a female. 0=male, 1=female 
 
5859 0.55 0.50 0,1 
Income Respondent’s income.  0=Less than $10,000, 
6=Greater than $80,000 
 
5208 2.60 1.61 0,6 
Vote Choice 
(1988) 
Vote choice in 1988. 0 = Dukakis, 1 = Bush. 
 
 
1984 0.58 0.49 0,1 
Vote Choice 
(1992) 
 
Vote choice in 1992.  0 = Clinton, 1 = Perot, 2= 
Bush 
1873 0.91 0.90 0,2 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 But see work by Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) and Shaw (1999a, 2006) 
2
 Shaw provides evidence that campaign context is related to statewide vote choices 
(1999b) and weekly tracking polls (2006).  Our analysis differs in that we 1) examine 
individual-level data and 2) focus on how campaign effects are mediated by underlying 
motivational factors such as partisanship. 
3
 Candidate appearance and advertising expenditures are taken from Shaw (2006). 
4
 This variable is measured in terms of constant (1982-86=100) per capita (voting age 
population) expenditures. 
5
 We chose to use one-third of the states for three reasons.  First, this gives us a number 
of states that is commensurate with the number that campaigns seem to believe they will 
have sufficient resources in which to compete (Shaw 1999b).  Second, this choice is 
justified on empirical grounds.  In grouping the states by thirds, we clearly separate those 
that receive significant attention from those that receive very little.   Third, we can 
provide face validity for our measure by comparing it to an assessment of campaign 
strategy based on campaign memorandum (see Appendix A; Shaw 1999b).  If we choose 
a different cut point for distinguishing between battleground and non-battleground states, 
we experience a loss in the overlap between our measure and those data. 
6
 Appendix A provides the details of our validity analysis. 
7
 The dates for the interviews vary by year.  In 1988, they began on November 14th and 
continued until December 20th.  In 1992, they stretched from November 4th until 
December 8th.  See Miller et al. (1999, pp. 25-26) for more details.   Because these data 
were gathered after Election Day, we cannot separate activation that occurs as a function 
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of campaign time in a manner that Finkel (1993) does, though this should not affect 
comparative differences between battleground and non-battleground states.   
8
 Underlying the comparison of voting behavior in battleground states to that in low 
intensity states is the assumption that there are no relevant differences between either the 
state context or the voters in those different types of states.  In analyses not reported here, 
we found few significant patterns in the types of voters in battleground states or in the 
competitiveness of Senate elections in these states.  Still, we recognize as a limitation of 
our study that we cannot exhaustively measure all of the relevant elements of state 
context and raise this as an issue for future research.  See Huber and Arceaneaux (in 
press) for a discussion of these issues. 
9
 Given the focus of the Senate Election Study on congressional elections, other variables 
that are often included in presidential vote choice models, such as issue perceptions of 
presidential candidates, are not available in these data. 
10
 Testing for significant differences here is a bit complicated since we are not testing two 
different models, but rather the same model on two different samples.  The method we 
used relied on running a model for the full sample and including a dummy variable for 
battleground states that was also interacted with all of the independent variables to 
express the differential impact of the model in battleground states compared to other 
states.  We then did a χ2 test for the joint impact of the battleground dummy variable and 
its associated interaction terms.  This test (χ2 = 12.83, p=.076) shows that the full model 
provided a marginally significant improvement in battleground states compared to other 
states.  It is worth noting that the interaction slopes and t-scores from this model are 
exactly equal to the “slope differences” and associated t-scores in Table 1.  We chose to 
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present the analysis by sub samples in order to make the differences as intuitively clear as 
possible.  Again, though, there are no substantive differences between the interaction 
model and the findings in Tables 1 & 2. 
11
 Though we interpret these effects as campaigns activating these traits, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that campaign exposure increases attitude accessibility.  It is also 
worth noting that effects of state context and/or additive effects of the campaigns that do 
not operate through individual traits have insignificant effects in 1988, as evidenced by 
the similar intercept values in battleground and low intensity states. 
12
 Because the dependent variable is trichotomous, we estimated coefficients and standard 
errors with a multinomial logit model. 
13
 Using the same method as used for Table 1, the difference in models is statistically 
significant (χ2 = 154.0, p=0.0000).   
14
 Unlike 1988, there are significant intercept differences in 1992.  Not only is the 
baseline probability of voting for Bush significantly lower in battleground states than in 
low intensity states, but we see that there is a significantly positive probability of voting 
for Perot over Clinton in low intensity states that is not present in battleground states.  
Interestingly, the fact that there are no significant differences in Perot voting in 
battleground and nonbattleground states lends weight to our argument since he ran a 
national campaign and did not over concentrate resources in specific states based on 
strategic considerations. 
15
 In addition, when approval is dropped from the model, the slope for economic 
evaluations is significant and in the anticipated direction in both battleground and non-
battleground states.  
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16
 Because we cannot test a hypothesis from the data that produce it (King et al. 1994), 
we offer this as an avenue for future research on how campaigns mobilize voting 
populations.  We particularly think that this is a promising avenue for linking research on 
campaign intensity to that on campaign messages. 
